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The Use of Contraries: 
Milton s Adaptation of Dialectic in 
uParadise Lost" 
ELAINE B. SAFER 
IN THE "brief" epic Paradise Regained, M i l t o n educates the 
reader by making him an indirect participant in a dialectic be-
tween Christ and Satan, a dialectic in which Christ unmasks the 
"weak arguing and fallacious drift" (PR, I I I , 4 ) 1 of the Adver-
sary. I wish to suggest that in the "diffuse" epic Paradise Lost 
there are a variety of dialectical exchanges. This complex process 
enables the silent participant — the reader — to refine his vision 
so that he gradually can distinguish truth from falsehood, good 
from evil. It is a progression that Mi l ton terms "knowledge in 
the making" (Areopagitica, Y P , I I , 5 5 4 ) . 
In Paradise Lost, instead of two figures (like Christ and Satan 
in Paradise Regained) there are multiple voices that bring forth 
the basic oppositions in which the epic involves us. One set of 
assumptions is argued by Satan, his followers, and postlapsarian 
A d a m and Eve before their repentance.2 Another is argued by 
the Father, the Son, Abdiel , the other good angels, prelapsarian 
A d a m and Eve, and the epic "voice." The method uncovers 
oppositions as the "force for proof" that calls forth reason. It is 
a process of thinking in dichotomies, of examining "contraries, 
which are absolutely diagonally adverse to each other" (Artis 
Logicae, C M , X I , 2 8 1 , 131 ) . 3 
Milton's method can be compared to that used in the Platonic 
dialectic. 4 Milton's stress on systematically analyzing contraries 
resembles Plato's belief that dialectical thinking is aroused by 
"things that impinge upon the senses together with their oppos-
ites" (Republic, 5 2 4 d ) . 5 The process causes the reader to ad-
vance from the darkness of falsity (like that in Plato's "Allegory 
of the Cave") to the light of truth. It is a movement from ig-
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norance to awareness, from our "senses dark" when we are at-
tracted to Satanic views to our appreciation of right reason. R u -
dolf Hirzel describes the Platonic dialectic as a series of circles, 
each of which touches upon the other, while being complete in 
itself. Such levels of contraries are like acts in a drama that draw 
the reader in as an active participant. 6 
In order better to understand the reader's response to the dia-
lectical process in Paradise Lost, this essay proposes to examine 
the Abdiel-Satan debate (at the close of Book V and the begin-
ning of Book V I ), where Abdiel exposes the contraries in Satan's 
argument, and the contrasting debates in Heaven and Hel l in 
which Mi l ton treats separately the antithetical elements of the 
Abdiel-Satan dialogue. 
In the Platonic dialogues, Socrates uses the method of argu-
ment by question and answer in order to reveal falsehood and 
progress toward the truth. For him the dialectical process con-
sists of conversation between questioner and respondent (not 
necessarily a Sophist), who is expected to answer as briefly as 
possible.7 Socrates questions people who claim to have knowledge 
of moral terms, like Meno, whom he asks to define virtue. Soc-
rates, as is his custom, points out contraries in the answer and 
makes suggestions that lead to new definitions and new ques-
tions. 
For those who admire the dialectical process (like Alcibiades 
in the Symposium) Socrates is a wonderful piper — like the sa-
tyr Marsyas. Such people find that Socratic questioning troubles 
their soul. They are forced to be concerned about moral issues. 
They feel embarrassed in his presence and yet fascinated by the 
beauty of the experience ("I think," says Alcibiades, "of those 
former admissions, and am ashamed" [Symposium, 216c] ). O n 
the other hand, Sophists, who speak for fees and are primarily 
concerned with winning an argument, react differently to Soc-
rates' constant prodding. In the Platonic dialogue the Sophist 
offers a definition that Socrates examines and questions. The 
definition is shown to be faulty; the Sophist attempts a second 
that is also unsuccessful; then a third or fourth, as Socrates con-
tinues to expose each as ridiculous. "The antagonist," explains 
James Geddes, " i f modest, withdraws as softly as he can: but, if 
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insolent and proud of his fame for eloquence, he turns in a fury 
. . . and pours forth all the ill-natured language he is master of." 8 
Mil ton captures the nature of the Sophist's upset and fury in 
Satan as he debates with the logical Abdie l : the fiend rails at 
Abdiel — "fly, ere evil intercept thy flight" ( V , 871 ) ; he views 
Abdiel "with scornful eye askance" ( V I , 1 4 9 ) ; and finally 
threatens combat — "receive / Thy merited reward, the first as-
say I Of this right hand provok'd, since first that tongue / In-
spir'd with contradiction durst oppose" ( V I , 152-55) . Mi l ton 
has made Satan a caricature of Sophists like Protagoras, who 
artfully tries to rectify the multiple contradictions in his state-
ments (Protagoras, 3 3 3 e - 3 4 c ) , and Euthydemus and Dionyso-
dorus, whose quibbles and distortions are easily disclosed as a 
useless game of tripping people: "Although one were to learn 
many or even all of such tricks, one would be not a whit the 
wiser as to the true state of the matters in hand" (Euthydemus, 
2 7 8 b ) . 
The Abdiel-Satan debate is a dramatic unit of adverse views. 
Satan expatiates on the meaning of justice and its loss at the 
moment of the exaltation of the Son. He moves from the point 
that the angels are "Equally free" to the false implication that 
they are all equal in merit, though "Orders and Degrees" exist 
( V , 7 9 2 ) . He asserts: "and if not equal all, yet free, / Equally 
free" ( V , 7 9 1 - 9 2 ) . This brings him to the conclusion, " W h o can 
in reason then or right assume / Monarchy over such as live by 
right I His equals, if in power and splendor less, / In freedom 
equal?" ( V , 794-97)- The conclusion echoes his earlier false as-
sertion that he " W h o m reason hath equall'd, force hath made 
supreme / Above his equals" (I, 2 4 8 - 4 9 ) . Satan distorts the facts 
to imply that the angels and the Son are equals. He works with 
semblances. He uses rhetorical tricks and loose analogies to prove 
that things resemble each other, when in fact they are contraries. 
Abdiel calmly responds to the Arch-fiend by questioning the 
meaning of injustice: "unjust thou say'st / Flatly unjust, to bind 
with Laws the free, / A n d equal over equals to let Reign" ( V , 
8 1 8 - 2 0 ) . He inquires whether Satan counts himself "Equa l to 
him begotten Son, by whom / As by his Word the mighty Father 
made / A l l things, ev'n thee" ( V , 8 3 5 - 3 7 ) . Satan dodges the 
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direct question and responds by claiming that he and the angels 
are self-begot. He offers as proof the fact that he did not see his 
creation : "who saw / When this creation was? remember'st thou 
I Thy making" ( V , 8 5 6 - 5 7 ) . That Satan is self-begot and that 
he did not see this happening are mutually exclusive. They are 
"opposites" that "cannot be attributed to the same thing" (Artis 
Logicae, C M , X I , 111 ).° 
Early in the debate Satan asks whether the Son "can intro-
duce J L a w and Edict on us, who without law / Er r not" ( V , 
7 9 7 - 9 9 ) . Satan's assertion here of the absence of law in Heaven 
is contrary to his later appeal (when speaking to the fallen an-
gels in Hel l ) to the "fixt Laws of Heav'n / [that] D i d first create 
your Leader" (II , 18-19) . The Fiend's statements here also are 
contradictory to a basic axiom of Heaven: freedom prevails 
through order, through obedience to law. In The Reason of 
Church Government Mi l ton states: " G o d himselfe hath writ his 
imperiall decrees through the great provinces of heav'n." He 
points out that "discipline is . . . the very visible shape and image 
of vertue" ( Y P , I, 7 5 1 - 5 2 ) . God's eternal laws bind God him-
self.1 0 Abdiel exposes Satan's faulty argument: "Shalt thou give 
L a w to G o d " ( V , 8 2 2 ) . 
The meaning of servitude and freedom in the dialogue be-
comes increasingly important. Satan defines the encounter be-
tween the faithful and his own followers as the combat of "Ser-
vility with freedom" ( V I , 1 6 9 ) . Abdiel explains: "Unjustly thou 
deprav'st it with the name / Of Servitude to serve whom God 
ordains" ( V I , 174-75) . He contrasts Satan's definition with the 
true nature of servitude. "This is servitude, / T o serve th' un-
wise, or him who hath rebell'd / Against his worthier, as thine 
now serve thee, / Thyself not free, but to thyself enthrall 'd" ( V I , 
178-81) . Abdiel , by examining the contrast between service to 
God and servility, illuminates the nature of servitude, the inter-
nal Hel l to which Satan is subject. 
In the Abdiel-Satan debate, Satan exhibits pretenses, decep-
tion, and lying, while Abdiel uses reason to expose contradiction 
in Satan's argument. As the Mil tonic dialogue progresses, the 
reader becomes a silent participant in this communal mode of 
inquiry. Mi l ton , in Artis Logicae, explains that logic has two 
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parts, "the invention of reasons or arguments and the disposition 
of them" ( C M , X I , 2 1 ) . In the disposition of ideas, when axi-
oms or syllogisms are formed, truth or falsity is discovered ( C M , 
X I , 3 0 9 ) . "Whenever one opposite is affirmed the other is 
thereby denied" ( C M , X I , 113) . Similarly, "an axiom is true 
when it speaks as the thing is; false when it does the opposite" 
( C M , X I , 3 0 9 ) . This is the logical method that Abdiel uses in 
debate with Satan. 
In the debates in Hel l and Heaven, Mi l ton treats separately 
the opposing elements of the Abdiel-Satan dialogue: the jug-
gling and distortion in Satan's council and the art of reasoning 
well in God's. Satan's discussion with his followers takes place 
in He l l , where the flames offer " N o light, but rather darkness 
visible" (I, 6 3 ) , an image that gives force to the lack of i l lumi-
nation, physical and mental, for Satan and his followers. Satan's 
interchange with the fallen angels moves along levels of ignor-
ance rather than levels of knowledge. N o one is concerned with 
or able to progress toward the truth. There is no Abdiel to ex-
pose the sophistry. 
Satan's opening address to the Host in the council in Hel l 
shows the method that is reflected throughout the devils' inter-
change. The fiends engage in rhetorical tricks to win arguments. 
They are like lawyers who "persuade men by the art which they 
possess, not teaching them, but making them have whatever 
opinion they l ike" (Theaetetus, 2 0 1 a ) . Satan flatters the Host: 
"Powers and Dominions, Deities of Heav 'n" (II , 11; italics 
added). His superlatives surpass those God employs in his ad-
dress to the Unfällen angels: "Thrones, Dominations, Prince-
doms, Virtues, Powers" ( V , 601 ). God, however, is merely being 
accurate in his description of the magnificent angels in Heaven. 
In contrast, Satan uses flattery to spur on the fallen angels in 
Hel l . Disregarding differences between fallen and Unfällen states, 
Satan builds upon semblances. He not only appeals to the an-
gels' sense of previous glory but also orients them toward a belief 
that their revolt has made them more glorious (a device he later 
uses with Eve) . Satan follows flattery with specious argument: 
"For since no deep within her gulf can hold / Immortal vigor, 
though opprest and fall 'n, / I give not Heav'n for lost" (II , 
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12-14) . That the angels are immortal is true, but that "no deep" 
can hold them is as false as the fiend's belief that Heaven is not 
lost for the fallen or that the rebellion in Heaven was a "dubious 
Battle" that "shook" God's throne (I, 1 0 4 - 1 0 5 ) . The narrator 
cautions the reader that the Arch-fiend never " H a d ris'n or 
heav'd his head, but that the wi l l / A n d high permission of all-
ruling Heaven" (I, 211-13) . But there is no corrective voice in 
Hel l to expose such contraries to the Sophists. 
Satan maintains: " I give not Heav'n for lost. From this de-
scent I Celestial Virtues rising, wil l appear / More glorious and 
more dread than from no fa l l" (II , 14-16) . The first assertion 
— "I give not Heav'n for lost" — is contradicted by the Adver-
sary's dark vision that can never afford him a glimpse of Heav-
en's light or truth, but only makes his own darkness visible. It 
also is contradicted by the He l l that burns within Satan wher-
ever he goes, preventing him from experiencing joy, even in 
Paradise. In addition, as supreme irony, the fiend's statement on 
the felix culpa — "From this descent / Celestial Virtues rising 
. . . " — applies not to himself or his Host but to his enemies, 
A d a m and Eve. They, indeed, through God's grace, wil l rise 
"More glorious. . . than from no f a l l . " 1 1 
The effect of Satan's oratorical skill is that listeners do not 
examine the argument for logic. Once Satan has his audience 
following him, he tends to introduce one contrariety after an-
other but is never questioned. He calls Heaven "The happier 
state" than Hel l , but implies that strife and envy exist in Heaven, 
not in Hel l : "where there is then no good / For which to strive, 
no strife can grow up there / From Faction" (II , 3 0 - 3 2 ) . This 
contradiction — based on the false premise that envy and strife 
exist in Heaven — predisposes the devils to favour He l l over 
Heaven and to think of He l l , not Heaven, as the "happier state." 
Satan calls himself the "Leader" (II , 19) and then follows with 
the assertion: "none sure wil l claim in He l l / Precedence" (II , 
32-33. The falsity in the fiend's argument is dramatized (for the 
reader) at the close of the debate when the Adversary despoti-
cally silences all rivals to his leadership, lest they win "cheap the 
high repute" (II, 4 7 2 ) that he desires. Satan shows sophistical 
deception as he convinces the Host that freedom can be achieved 
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by relying on him. Following the fiend's address, the angels " T o -
wards him . . . bend / Wi th awful reverence prone ; and as a 
God I Extol h im" (II , 4 7 7 - 7 9 ) . 
Underlying all Satan's statements in the interchange in Book 
II is the proclamation that there is no justice or freedom in 
Heaven, that God "holds the Tyranny of Heav 'n" (I, 124) and 
obtains glory by having those beneath him "bow and sue for 
grace / W i t h suppliant knee" (I, 111-12). In the interchange in 
Hel l the only question Satan poses is the method of revenge — 
"Whether of open War or covert guile" (II , 41 ) . 1 2 His defini-
tions of the nature of justice, freedom, and goodness remain un-
challenged. The Host readily accept all Satan's explanations. 
They reiterate his views and base their own arguments upon 
them. They see no justice in their punishment for disobedience 
because they view obedience to God as "Subjection" (II , 2 3 9 ) . 
Worship paid to such a leader is "vassalage" (II , 2 5 2 ) . The 
Lord is " O u r envied Sovran" (II , 2 4 4 ) , who tyranically "Reigns 
I By our delay" (II , 5 9 - 6 0 ) , asserts Moloch, who wants to pro-
claim open war. Belial, "with words cloth'd in reason's garb" 
(II , 2 2 6 ) , argues for watchful waiting so as not to unleash the 
wrath of God, the fury of the tyrant's "afflicting Thunder" (II, 
166 ). A n d Mammon, "the least erected Spirit that fell" ( I, 679 ) , 
proclaims Hel l superior to Heaven that is under God's tyranny. 
He speaks of "preferring / Hard liberty before the easy yoke / 
O f servile Pomp" (II, 2 5 5 - 5 7 ) . Each of the devils shows sophis-
try i n making "the worse appear / T h e better reason" ( I I , 
" 3 - 1 4 ) -
In the council in He l l the fiend is similar to the Sophist Thra-
symachus, in the Republic, who argues for injustice in the name 
of justice. 1 3 Socrates argues against injustice and points out that 
"the tyrannized sou l , " l ike the tyrannized ci ty, teems " w i t h 
boundless servility and illiberality, the best and most reasonable 
parts of it being enslaved, while a small part, the worst and the 
most frenzied, plays the despot" (Republic, 5 7 7 a ) . We see such 
a city in Hel l and such a tyrannized soul in Satan and each of 
his followers. The devils work out sophistical arguments by dodg-
ing crucial issues and jumping quickly from one subject to the 
next. They all exhibit a fixed line of vision that equates service 
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to God with servility and equates freedom with opposition to 
G o d . Satan's exclamat ion ( in sol i loquy) " E v i l be thou my 
Good" ( I V , n o ) epitomizes the orientation of the fallen who 
fail to appreciate contradictions in reasoning and are " i n wan-
d'ring mazes lost" (II , 561 ) . 
Mil ton begins Paradise Lost in Hel l , where we hear the rhet-
oric of Satan and the Host. It is a world of semblances and shad-
ows, a "darkness visible." This calls to mind Plato's cave, one of 
the great metaphors for a confused state of being, where men, 
whose legs and necks are fettered from birth, look at shadows 
cast from the fire on the wall of the subterranean cavern. In 
Plato 's Al legory (Republic, 5 i 4 a - i y a ) , a human being is 
dragged periodically from the ignorant condition of the masses 
in order to look upon the sun itself and contemplate its nature. 
When he returns and tries to explain the truth to his fellow men, 
who are accustomed to the shadows or copies of reality, he is 
misunderstood and mocked. Mi l ton parodies this upward move-
ment toward knowledge by having Satan physically ascend from 
He l l to the light of the Sun. He, however, unlike Plato's inhabi-
tant of the cave, shows a fixity of orientation. He never is able 
to see the true nature of the sun: "I hate thy beams" ( I V , 3 7 ) . 
His "mind is its own place," "for within h im Hel l / He brings, 
and round about h i m " (I, 2 5 4 ; I V , 2 0 - 2 1 ) . When the fiend 
does return to Hel l — after his travels to the Gate of Heaven 
and to Paradise — he obviously has not benefited from the light. 
His thinking has remained sophistical throughout. It is, there-
fore, appropriate that the Adversary's faulty reasoning, filled 
with contraries, leads him back where he began: prone in Hel l . 
It also is appropriate that the sophistical thinker be metamor-
phosed into a "monstrous Serpent" ( X , 5 1 4 ) , one of the lowest 
of God's creatures. He becomes a concrete manifestation of the 
Platonic notion that virtue is mirrored in one's outer appearance. 
The debate in Heaven, in Book III , is the antithesis of the 
interchange in Hel l . There are two logical speakers, in contrast 
to the debate in He l l where all are sophistical. The dialogue in 
Heaven affords us an enlarged presentation of the art of reason-
ing well which Abdiel displays in Books V and V I . We see an 
upward movement in the dialogue in Heaven, where there is no 
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distortion, no false thinking. Possible contraries are examined 
calmly by the Father and the Son as they progress toward a 
definition of justice. Their questioning shows acute perceptivity, 
a pattern of unravelling contraries, a constant forward course 
toward truth. 
In the interchange in Heaven Mi l ton uniquely adapts the 
dialogical form to his own purposes, as he essentially casts both 
questioner and respondent in the Socratic role, each progressing 
toward the elimination of contraries, in an upward movement 
toward awareness. A t the onset the Father strictly defines justice 
in O l d Testament terms of retribution, as he foretells the Fal l of 
man: "For M a n w i l l . . . / . . . easily transgress the sole Com-
mand, I Sole pledge of his obedience: So wil l fall / Hee and his 
faithless Progeny: whose fault? / W h o s e but his own? ingrate, 
he had of mee / A l l he could have" (III , 9 3 - 9 8 ) . Milton's God 
lays stress on the fact that A d a m and Eve are "Sufficient to have 
stood, though free to fal l" (III , 9 9 ) . "They themselves decreed 
I Th i r own revolt, not I " ( III , 116-17; italics added). The defi-
nition of justice in these lines has been criticized for being most 
severe. Marjorie Nicolson observes: "God's first speeches are 
shocking to our sensibilities. He suddenly emerges to come down 
to our own level , speaking . . . [like] a somewhat querulous 
schoolmaster." For Douglas Bush, "the trouble lies in the some-
what legal character of Christian theology itself and in the in -
evitable effects of dramatization." 1 4 
The dialogue in Heaven focuses on the meaning of justice, as 
the Son questions the Father's statements. The seeds of the Son's 
questioning of the Father's justice are anticipated — but not de-
veloped — in the Father's speech, which concludes with the 
statement: " M a n therefore shall find grace, / . . . in Mercy and 
Justice both, / Through Heav'n and Earth, so shall my glory 
excel, I But Mercy first and last shall brightest shine" (III , 131-
34 ). The Son picks up on the promise of grace. In fact, at first 
He seems not to be debating with the Father but rather reiterat-
ing His promise. However, following His praise of grace for 
mankind, the Son clarifies the meaning of justice by questioning 
the O l d Testament definition, which the Father stressed in the 
earlier part of the speech. He questions the justice of destroying 
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A d a m and Eve because they disobeyed; he inquires whether ret-
ribution would create the greatest goodness, whether the O l d 
Testament conception of justice is indeed valid. 
Michael Lieb has shown 1 5 that the Son's questioning of the 
Father's initial definition of justice resembles Moses' challenge 
of God's justice in Exodus 32 when the Israelites broke God's 
commandments and practiced idolatry at the very time that 
Moses was on M t . Sinai receiving the Laws: " A n d the L o r d 
said unto Moses . . . thy people . . . have corrupted themselves. 
. . . N o w therefore let me alone, that my wrath may wax hot 
against them, and that I may consume them" (Exodus, 3 2 : 
7 - 1 0 ) . 1 6 Moses asks: " L o r d why doth thy wrath wax hot against 
thy people . . . Wherefore should the Egyptians speak, and say, 
For mischief did he bring them out, to slay them in the moun-
tains . . . Tu rn from thy fierce wrath, and repent of this evil 
against thy people." We are told that God indeed "repented of 
the evil which he thought to do unto his people" (Exodus, 3 2 : 
11-14)-
S. R . Driver explains that the Hebrew idiom 'repent' often 
attributes "to God the feelings or emotions of a man. God is thus 
said to 'repent' . . . when, in consequence of a change in the 
character and conduct of men, He is obliged to make a corres-
ponding change in the purpose towards them which He had 
previously announced." 1 7 In dialogue with Moses, God is said to 
repent, that is to turn from destroying the Israelites. In contrast, 
Milton's God always has grace in mind ( I I I , 131-34)- This is 
emphasized by the fact that, at the completion of the Son's argu-
ment to save mankind, the Father observes: " A l l hast thou 
spok'n as my thoughts are, all / As my Eternal purpose hath de-
creed" (III , 171-72). Mi l ton uses a dialogue form similar to 
that which exists in Exodus, in order to make manifest for a 
fallen audience the process by which God (presumably instan-
taneously) arrived at His conception of justice. Mi l ton comes as 
close to the dialogue as theological decorum wil l permit in the 
dramatic interchange. He adapts the dialogue form to portray 
the "play-acting [or drama] of the persons of the godhead," (De 
Doctrina Christiana, Y P , V I , 2 1 3 ) 1 8 so that we can glimpse the 
Deity in terms of human purposes. 
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The Son sets up a series of oppositions that equate destruction 
with evil and creation with God's goodness, as he urges the Fa-
ther to save man. 
For should Man finally be lost, should M a n 
Thy creature late so lov'd, thy youngest Son 
Fall circumvented thus by fraud, though join'd 
With his own folly? that be from thee far, 
That far be from thee, Father, who art Judge 
Of all things made, and judgest only right. 
Or shall the Adversary thus obtain 
His end, and frustrate thine, shall he fulfill 
His malice, and thy goodness bring to naught, 
Or proud return though to his heavier doom, 
Yet with revenge accomplish't and to Hell 
Draw after him the whole Race of mankind, 
By him corrupted? or wilt thou thyself 
Abolish thy Creation, and unmake, 
For him, what for thy glory thou hast made? 
So should thy goodness and thy greatness both 
Be question'd and blasphem'd without defense. 
( I l l , 150-66; italics added) 
The Son's statement, "That far be from thee, Father," indicates 
that the following are logically contrary to God's goodness: the 
rejection of A d a m (III , 1 5 0 - 5 5 ) ; fulfillment of Satan's malice 
(III , 156-58) ; the drawing of the race of mankind to He l l (III , 
1 5 9 - 6 2 ) ; abolishing mankind, God's creation ( H I , 1 6 2 - 6 4 ) . 
Just as Moses argued that God not slay the Israelites, so the Son 
argues that the Father not destroy A d a m and Eve. His words, 
"So should thy goodness and thy greatness both / Be question'd 
and blasphem'd without defense" (III , 1 6 5 - 6 6 ) , echoes Moses' 
plea: "Wherefore should the Egyptians speak, and say, For mis-
chief did he bring them out, to slay them" (Exodus, 3 2 : 1 2 ) . 
This constant dialogical questioning is central to Milton's think-
ing. It is the poet's method of figuring forth the abstract, of giv-
ing substance to "what surmounts the reach / O f human sense" 
( V , 5 7 1 - 7 2 ) . 
The conclusion of the first level in this dialogue stresses tem-
pering justice with mercy, and thus broadens the O l d Testament 
definition. The ramifications, however, are not fully worked out. 
The Father asserts: "Die hee or Justice must; unless for him / 
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Some other able, and as willing, pay / The rigid satisfaction, 
death for death" ( III , 2 1 0 - 1 2 ) . He asks: "Say Heav'nly Pow-
ers, where shall we find such love." Then He inquires: "Dwells 
in all Heaven charity so dear?" ( I l l , 2 1 3 - 1 6 ) . The Son responds 
by reiterating the Father's assertion that man shall have grace, 
explaining the significance of grace, that "Comes unprevented, 
unimplor'd, unsought." " A n d shall grace not find means," He 
asks; then He immediately proclaims His love for man: "Behold 
mee then, mee for him, life for life / I offer, on mee let thine 
anger fall ; / Account mee man" (III , 2 2 8 - 3 8 ) . His faith in the 
Father's goodness next causes the Son to conclude: "yet that 
debt paid, / Thou wilt not leave me in the loathsome grave" 
(III , 2 4 6 - 4 7 ) . The Son's affirmation embodies the New Testa-
ment focus on mercy as an integral part of justice. The reader 
appreciates that Christ's Incarnation and Crucifixion fully carry 
out the meaning of justice. The angelic choral repeats the point : 
"So M a n , as is most just, / Shall satisfy for M a n , be judg'd and 
die, J A n d dying rise, and rising with him raise / His Brethren" 
(III , 2 9 4 - 9 7 ; italics added). 
Throughout Paradise Lost there is an emphasis on the art of 
reasoning well. The Father, the Son, Abdiel , the other good an-
gels, and the epic "voice" continually uncover the absurdity of 
contraries in speeches by Satan, the other fallen angels, and post-
lapsarian A d a m and Eve. By depicting the Father and the Son 
as exemplars of right reason in Heaven and the devils as sophis-
tical thinkers in Hel l , Mi l t on intensifies the need to choose, be-
tween good and evil, clarity and falsehood — dichotomies that 
are central to the dialectical process and are at the heart of the 
justification of the ways of God to men in Paradise Lost. 
Critics have viewed Paradise Lost as an epic, a pastoral, a 
Biblical narrative, an Ovidian metamorphosis, a tragedy, a D i -
vine comedy, an allegory, and most recent criticism has stressed 
its prophetic structure. 1 9 The prophetic mode is, of course, dif-
ferent from the dialectical process. A strategy of allusiveness, a 
stress on inspiration, on unlocking visionary meanings, and on 
"teaching men to see not with but through the eye" 2 0 differs 
from the analytic process that advances by examining dichoto-
mies, a process that uncovers opposites, instead of dealing in 
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"mysterious terms" and proleptic forms. 2 1 However, it seems to 
me that in Paradise Lost these two processes work harmoniously. 
In Artis Logicae Mi l t on speaks of "artificial" and "inartificial" 
arguments: the artificial "argues of itself" ( C M , X I , 2 7 ) , con-
tains proof w i th in itself, has the power of ins t ruct ing man 
through reason. The inartificial, "Divine testimony," Mi l ton ex-
plains is mysterious; it "affirms or denies that a thing is so and 
brings about that I believe; it does not prove, it does not teach, 
it does not cause me to know or understand why things are so, 
unless it also brings forward reasons" ( C M , X I , 2 8 3 ) . O n a 
logical level, Mi l ton exposes contraries as "force for proof" ( C M , 
X I , 281 ) , while on a prophetic level he invites "us to look for-
ward to the Final Place of Rest." 2 2 M i l t o n was concerned with 
A d a m and Eve's need "to choose / Th i r place of rest" at the 
same time that he was confident that they were to do so with 
"Providence thir guide" ( X I I , 6 4 6 - 4 7 ) . The need to "choose" 
emphasizes Milton's concern for the "true warfaring Christian" 
in a postlapsarian world, where we know "good by evi l l ," where 
"that which purifies us is triall, and triall is by what is contrary" 
(Areopagitica, Y P , 5 1 4 - 1 5 ) . The reference to God and His 
Providence shows Milton's faith in Divine prediction. Mi l t on 
was preoccupied with " A l p h a and Omega, the beginning and 
the end, the first and the last" (Revelation, X X I I : 1 3 ) , but he 
also was concerned with the present: with man's responsibility 
to stand as a rational and just human being in a postlapsarian 
world . 2 3 
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